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Abstract
We introduce a new solution concept for games in extensive form with perfect informa-
tion: the valuation equilibrium. The moves of each player are partitioned into similarity
classes. A valuation of the player is a real valued function on the set of her similarity
classes. At each node a player chooses a move that belongs to a class with maximum
valuation. The valuation of each player is consistent with the strategy proﬁle in the sense
that the valuation of a similarity class is the player expected payoﬀ given that the path
(induced by the strategy proﬁle) intersects the similarity class. The solution concept
is applied to decision problems and multi-player extensive form games. It is contrasted
with existing solution concepts. An aspiration-based approach is also proposed, in which
the similarity partitions are determined endogenously. The corresponding equilibrium is
called the aspiration-based valuation equilibrium (ASVE). While the Subgame Perfect
Nash Equilibrium is always an ASVE, there are other ASVE in general. But, in zero-sum
two-player games without chance moves every player must get her value in any ASVE.
Key words: Game theory, bounded rationality, valuation, similarity, aspiration.
JEL numbers: C72, D81.
11 Introduction
Learning the performance of every possible move in a game in extensive form may be quite
diﬃcult if the game has many decision nodes and many moves at every decision node. An
alternative that we study here is the partitioning of all possible moves of a player into sets
of moves, referred to as similarity classes. Performance is attributed by the player to the
similarity classes rather than the individual moves. The performance of the similarity classes
of a player is expressed by a valuation, that is, a function which assigns a numerical value to
each of the similarity classes.
We introduce two new solution concepts for games in extensive form with perfect infor-
mation, based on similarity classes and their valuation: valuation equilibrium and sequential
valuation equilibrium. A Valuation Equilibrium is a proﬁle of behavioral strategies such that
for some system of valuations two conditions are satisﬁed.
² Each player’s strategy must be optimal for her valuation. By this we mean that at
each node where she plays she chooses one of the moves that belongs to a class with
maximum valuation.
² Each player’s valuation must be consistent with the strategy proﬁle. That is, the
valuation attached to a similarity class of a player is the expected payoﬀ of the player
given that the path (induced by the strategy proﬁle) intersects this class.
The consistency requirement imposes constraints only on the valuations of those sim-
ilarity classes that are reached with positive probability in equilibrium. Our second and
main solution concept, the sequential valuation equilibrium, imposes a stronger notion of
consistency that applies also to unreached similarity classes. Very much like the sequential
equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson 1982) the stronger notion of consistency requires that the
valuations of unreached similarity classes must be consistent with small perturbations of the
strategy proﬁle.
In the main part of the paper we take the sequential valuation equilibrium as our starting
point and we analyze the properties of these equilibria for various similarity partitions.
We provide in subsection 2.4 a motivation for the sequential valuation equilibrium by a
learning model. We introduce a simple learning process in which the game is played repeat-
edly, and the players update their valuations after each round according to the outcome of the
round. Whenever this learning process converges, players asymptotically behave according
to a sequential valuation equilibrium.1
1In Jehiel and Samet (2000) we prove the convergence of similar learning processes for maximal similarity
classes.
2It should be noted that in most of this paper the similarity partition of moves is given
exogenously. These partitions should be thought of as being part of the description of the
environment much the same as information partitions are part of the description of a game
with imperfect information.2 However, in Section 5 we study similarity classes that are
determined endogenously according to a principle based on the aspiration idea.
We start, in Section 3, by making a few preliminary observations. We ﬁrst show that
a sequential valuation equilibrium (SVE) always exists, for any given similarity partitions.
For maximal similarity partitions (i.e. no two moves belong to the same similarity class), an
SVE coincides with a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. Moreover, Sequential Equilibria
of games with incomplete information and perfect recall can always be represented as SVE
by suitable choices of similarity partitions. But, in general an SVE need not even be a Nash
Equilibrium.
Illustrations of the solution concept are introduced in Section 4. We ﬁrst consider deci-
sion problems, and then move on to multi-player games. We provide a one-agent decision
problem involving chance moves such that in equilibrium the agent makes the worst possible
decision at every decision node, thus illustrating a sharp contrast with standard notions of
equilibrium. We next provide a two-player example, in which one of the players is better oﬀ
in equilibrium whenever he has a coarser similarity partition. We also provide an example of
complete information game in extensive form in which the SVE approach forces the players
to randomize at each of their decision nodes. The example also serves to contrast the SVE
approach with other approaches to the grouping of moves, in particular that of imperfect
recall (Piccione and Rubinstein 1997), and that of the analogy-based expectation approach
(Jehiel 2001).
In the last section of the paper, the similarity partitions are endogenized. We assume
that players categorize moves according to whether they deliver less, more or the same level
of payoﬀ as a benchmark payoﬀ referred to as the aspiration level, which is assumed to be
the equilibrium payoﬀ. We refer to such equilibria as aspiration-based sequential valuation
equilibrium (ASVE). While the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium is always an ASVE, other
strategy proﬁles may be ASVE. But, in zero-sum two-player games without chance moves a
player must get her value in any ASVE.
2From the viewpoint of learning, this amounts to assuming that players do not change their similarity
relations during the learning process.
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2.1 Games and strategies
Consider a ﬁnite game G with perfect information and a ﬁnite set of players I. The game
is described by a tree (Z;N;r;A), where Z and N are the (ﬁnite) sets of terminal and non-
terminal nodes, correspondingly, r is the root of the tree, and A the set of arcs. Elements of
A are ordered pairs (n;m), where m is the immediate successor of n.
For each i 2 I, the function fi : Z ¡! R is i’s payoﬀ. The set Ni for i 2 I is the set of
nodes in which it is i’s turn to play. The sets Ni are disjoint. The moves of player i at node
n 2 Ni are the nodes in Mi(n) = fm j (n;m) 2 Ag. Denote Mi =
S
n2Ni Mi(n).
A (behavioral) strategy for player i is a function ¾i deﬁned on Ni such that for each
n 2 Ni, ¾i(n) is a probability distribution on Mi(n).
The nodes in N n [i2INi belong to Nature, which has a ﬁxed strategy.
For a strategy proﬁle ¾ = (¾i)ı2I, let P¾ the probability over Z induced by ¾ and Nature’s
strategy. That is, P¾(z) is the probability that z is reached when ¾ is played.
2.2 Similarity and valuation
Player i has a relation of similarity on Mi, her set of moves. We assume that it is an
equivalence relationship and denote by Λi the partition of Mi into similarity classes. For
m 2 Mi, ¸(m) denotes the similarity class in Λi that contains m. For each similarity class
¸ 2 Λi, we let Z(¸) be the set of all terminal nodes that are descendants of some node in ¸.
A valuation for player i is a function vi : Λi ¡! R.
2.3 Equilibria
We say that the strategy ¾i is optimal for the valuation vi, if for each n 2 Ni and m 2 Mi(n),
¾i(n)(m) = 0 whenever m = 2 argmaxm2Mi(n) vi(¸(m)). That is, if i chooses in each of her
nodes, with probability 1, only those actions that belong to similarity classes with maximal
valuation.
We say that the valuation vi is consistent with the proﬁle ¾ if for each ¸ 2 Λi, with
P¾(Z(¸)) > 0, vi(¸) =
P
z2Z(¸) P¾(z)fi(z)=P¾(Z(¸)). That is, if the valuation of a similarity
class ¸ is i’s expected payoﬀ given that (at least) one of the nodes in ¸ was reached. We note
that if ¾ is completely mixed (i.e. ¾i(n)(m) > 0 for all i and (n;m) 2 A;n 2 Ni - we write
¾ > 0) then there exists a unique valuation v which is consistent with ¾.
Deﬁnition 1 A strategy proﬁle ¾ = (¾i)i2I is a valuation equilibrium (VE) if there exists
a valuation proﬁle v = (vi)i2I such that for each i,
4² ¾i is optimal for vi,
² vi is consistent with ¾.
Note that being consistent with ¾ does not impose any restriction on the valuation of
similarity classes that are not reached under ¾. Thus, it is possible that a strategy proﬁle is
supported by a valuation for the “wrong” reason. Player i may avoid all actions in a certain
similarity class because it has a low valuation. This low valuation, in turn, is arbitrarily
small, and bears no relation to the payoﬀs at terminal nodes that are reached from the class.
Still, consistency is maintained because the class is never reached.
To avoid such equilibria we reﬁne the notion of VE in a way that parallels the notion of
sequential equilibrium. We require that the valuation v reﬂects possible payoﬀs at nodes that
are not reached, much the same as beliefs in sequential equilibrium reﬂect possible beliefs at
nodes that are not reached.
We say that a valuation vi is sequentially consistent with the strategy proﬁle ¾, if there
exists a sequence of completely mixed strategy proﬁles (¾k)1
k=1 such that ¾k converges to ¾,
and vk
i converges to vi, where vk
i is the unique valuation consistent with ¾k.
Deﬁnition 2 A strategy proﬁle ¾, is a sequential valuation equilibrium (SVE) if there
exists a valuation proﬁle v = (vi)i2I such that for each i,
² ¾i is optimal for vi,
² vi is sequentially consistent with ¾.
It is easy to see that sequential consistency implies consistency, and thus an SVE is also
a VE.
2.4 Learning processes that lead to valuation equilibria
We illustrate reinforcement learning processes, the limit points of which must be valuation,
or sequential valuation equilibria. In Jehiel and Samet (2000) such a process has been studied
for the case that the similarity relation is maximal (i.e., no two distinct nodes are similar).
The processes here are variants of the learning model in Jehiel and Samet (2000).
Consider the inﬁnitely repeated game of G. We denote by h an inﬁnite history in the
repeated game, and by ht the ﬁnite history of the ﬁrst t rounds in h. Assume that at the
beginning of the repeated game each player has some initial valuation, and after each round
she revises her valuation. After a given ﬁnite history ht of the repeated game, the valuation
5of a move m of player i is her average payoﬀ in those rounds in ht in which she made a move
similar to m. If no such move was made, then m has the initial valuation.
Assume further that the strategies of the players in the repeated game satisfy the following
condition. For each ﬁnite history ht and player i there exists " = "(ht;i), such that player i’s
strategy in G, after ht, ¾ht
i , is "-optimal for her valuation vht
i . That is, for any m0 2 Mi(n),
if vht
i (m0) < maxvht
i (m)¡", then m0 is played with probability 0. Moreover, we assume that
for each i, "(ht;i) ! 0 when t ! 1.
Consider now the event E that ¾ht
i converges to ¾. That is, E is the set of inﬁnite histories
h such that the strategy proﬁles along h converge to ¾. For each set of end nodes Z(¸) that
has a positive probability under ¾, vht must converge. Let v be valuation which is the limit
of vht on sets Z(¸) with positive probability, and deﬁned arbitrarily small on all other such
sets.
Since ¾ht
i is "-optimal for vht
i , and since " converges to 0 when t ! 1, it follows that the
limiting strategy ¾i is optimal for the limiting valuation vi.
Consider now a set of end nodes in Z(¸) that has a positive probability under ¾. By the
stability theorem (see Lo` eve (1963)) the frequency of the end nodes in Z(¸) along histories
in E, converges to the conditional probability of these nodes according to ¾. This shows that
v is consistent with ¾. Thus, the limit ¾ is a valuation equilibrium.
Suppose now that for each history ht, ¾ht > 0. Let E be the event that for each subtree
of G the conditional probability of ¾ht converges. In particular ¾ht converges to a strategy
proﬁle ¾. Moreover, the valuations vht also converge on each set Z(¸). As before, ¾ is optimal
for v. Consider the valuation uht which is the unique valuation consistent with ¾ht. Then,
using again the stability theorem we can show that uht converges to v, which shows that ¾
is a sequential valuation equilibrium.
3 General Properties
3.1 Existence
Since each SVE is also a VE it is enough to prove the existence of an SVE.
Proposition 1 For each game G there exists at least one sequential valuation equilibrium.
Proof. The strategy of proof is the same as that for the existence of sequential equilibria
(Kreps-Wilson 1982). Consider the set Σ" of strategy proﬁles ¾" that satisfy ¾" > ". For any
strategy proﬁle ¾" 2 Σ" there exists a unique valuation v(¾") such that for each i, vi(¾") is
6consistent with ¾". By the equations that deﬁne valuations, v(¾") depends continuously on
¾" in Σ".
We say that player i’s strategy ¾i is "-optimal for the valuation vi, if for each n 2 Ni and
m 2 Mi(n), ¾i(n)(m) = " whenever m = 2 argmaxm2Mi(n) vi(¸(m)). Consider the correspon-
dence that associates with each ¾" 2 Σ" the set of all strategy proﬁles ˆ ¾" 2 Σ" such that for
each i, ˆ ¾"
i is "-optimal for the valuation vi(¾"). It is easy to see that this correspondence is
upper hemicontinuous with non-empty closed convex values. It follows by Kakutani’s ﬁxed
point theorem that there exists ¾" such that for each i, ¾"
i is "-optimal for the valuation v"
i
which is the unique valuation i consistent with ¾".
By compactness, there are ¾ and v and a subsequence of ¾"k with "k ! 0 such that
both ¾"k ! ¾ and v(¾"k) ! v. By continuity ¾ is optimal for v and hence it is a sequential
valuation equilibrium.
3.2 The trivial similarity relations
For the two trivial similarity relations, the largest and the smallest, the characterization of
VE’s and SVE’s is rather simple.
Proposition 2 Suppose that for each player i all the nodes in Mi are similar. Then every
strategy proﬁle is a SVE.
Proposition 3 Suppose that for each player i no two diﬀerent nodes in Mi are similar. Then
a strategy proﬁle is SVE iﬀ it is a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium.
For completeness, we also include the characterization of VE’s, when the similarity rela-
tion is maximal, which is simple for the generic case:3
Proposition 4 Suppose that for each player i no two diﬀerent nodes in Mi are similar, and
for every two terminal nodes z 6= z0, fi(z) 6= fi(z0). Then a strategy proﬁle ¾ is VE iﬀ the
probability P¾ it induces over the terminal nodes assigns probability 1 to one of these nodes.
3.3 Games with imperfect information
Consider an imperfect information game deﬁned on the tree (Z;N;r;A) with payoﬀ function
fi. Let Υi be the partition of i’s nodes, Ni, into information sets of player i, and Λi the
3When fi(z) = fi(z
0) a mixed distribution over z and z
0 can be sustained provided player i gets a chance
to choose between the subgames containing z and z
0 at some decision node. In the generic case considered in
the proposition it can be shown by contradiction that no randomization can occur on the equilibrium path
(take the last reached node such that the behavior at that node is random).
7partition of i’s moves, Mi, into actions. Thus for any action ¸ = fm1;:::;mkg 2 Λi all the
nodes in ¸ have diﬀerent immediate predecessors, and the set of these immediate predecessors
fn1;:::;nkg is an information set in Υi.
Proposition 5 Consider a game with imperfect information and perfect recall deﬁned on
(Z;N;r;A) with payoﬀ functions (fi)i2I and action partitions (Λi)i2I. Let an assessment
(¾;¹) of this game (where ¹ denotes a belief system) be a Sequential Equilibrium. Then ¾ is
a Sequential Valuation Equilibrium of the game (Z;N;r;A) with payoﬀ functions (fi)i2I and
similarity relations (Λi)i2I.
Proof. For each player i we deﬁne a valuation vi as follows. For an action ¸ 2 (Λi), vi(¸)
is i’s expected payoﬀ when she chooses action ¸, conditional on being at information set in
which ¸ is available. This expected payoﬀ is computed using the probability of the nodes
in the information set (given by ¹) and the the probability of reaching each of the terminal
nodes (given by ¾). By the very deﬁnition of sequential rationality, ¾i is optimal for vi.
The strategy proﬁle ¾ is the limit of strategy proﬁles ¾k > 0. For each ¾k we deﬁne the
valuation vk as above (where the probability of each node in the information set is given by
¾k). The expected value of an action ¸ of player i is exactly
P
z2Z(¸) P¾(z)fi(z)=P¾(Z(¸)),
and therefore vk is consistent with ¾k. Since ¹ is the limit of the the conditional probabilities
of ¾k on information sets, it follows that vk ! v.
4 Illustrations
We now provide some illustrations of how the SVE concept works. We start with decision
problems and then move to multi-player setups.
4.1 Decision problems
Obviously, in a decision problem the agent cannot beneﬁt from the grouping of moves into
similarity classes. It can only prevent him from making optimal decisions in all circumstances.
The following example illustrates a more dramatic case in which due to similarity grouping,
making the worst decision is a valuation equilibrium, while making the best one is not. It is
somewhat surprising in light of the optimality requirement in valuation equilibrium.
Example 1. The decision tree is depicted by the solid lines in ﬁgure 1. At the root r,
nature chooses one of three nodes x, y and z with equal probability. At each of these nodes,
the decision maker can choose between a good action or a bad one, where the payoﬀ is higher
in the ﬁrst. The payoﬀs are written next to these nodes. The three doted lines connect
8similar nodes. Thus, the set M is partitioned into the similarity classes fgx;gzg, fbx;byg, and
fgy;bzg.
The strategy ¾ that selects at each of the nodes x, y and z the bad action is a VE. To
see this, consider the valuation v given in the ﬁgure. Obviously, it is consistent with ¾, and
¾ is optimal for v. Moreover, ¾ is also a SVE. Indeed, for each k let ¾k be the strategy
in which the good action in each node has probability 1=k and the bad one 1 ¡ 1=k. The
unique valuation that is consistent with ¾k is given by vk(fgx;gzg) = 3, vk(fbx;byg) = 5, and
vk(fgy;bzg) = 4(1¡1=k)+12(1=k). Obviously, ¾k ! ¾, and for small enough k, ¾ is optimal
for vk.
Note, however, that the strategy ¿ that selects the good action in each node is not a
valuation equilibrium. Indeed, for a valuation u to be consistent with ¿, it must satisfy
u(fgx;gzg) = 3 and u(fgy;bzg) = 12. But ¿ is not optimal for such u (consider node z).
Figure 1: A valuation equilibrium in a decision problem
................
















v = 5 v = 3
v = 4
In Example 1 the role of nature is crucial. In a decision problem without moves of nature,
similarity grouping cannot be so detrimental as can easily be shown:
Proposition 6 In a decision problem (i.e., a game with one player) without moves of nature,
any strategy ¾ that guarantees the maximal payoﬀ is a sequential valuation equilibrium.
4.2 Multi-player setups
In decision problems, we have seen that the grouping of moves may hurt the agent. Clearly,
this may also happen in multi-agent setups. But, a new observation is that grouping may
9sometimes help the player when there are other players around. The following example
illustrates the claim.
Example 2. In the game in Figure 2 there are two players A and B. Each player in her
turn can chose between two actions “take” or “pass”. Nodes are labelled as in the ﬁgure and
payoﬀs appear next to the ﬁnal leaves.







In the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of this game players A and B pass in the ﬁrst
two moves, and A takes in the third and her payoﬀ is 1.
Assume now that player A bundles the moves p1 and p3 into a single similarity class
denoted Pass, while all other similarity classes are singletons. Consider the following strategy
proﬁle ¾: player A passes at nodes r and p2, and B takes at node p1. To see that ¾ is a
SVE, consider the valuations vA and vB that assigns to each of the moves ti the payoﬀ of the
appropriate player at this node, while vA(Pass) = 2 and vB(fp2g) = 0. It is readily veriﬁed
that ¾i, for i = A;B, is optimal for vi. In this SVE player A’s payoﬀ is 2, which is more than
what he gets in the SPNE.
The next example serves to illustrate that SVE may force randomization in circumstances
in which it would not arise in standard notions of equilibrium.
Example 3. The game in Figure 3 diﬀers from that in Figure 2 only in the payoﬀs. We
assume that the similarity relation is the same as in the previous example. Here there is a
unique SVE, and it employs mixed strategies. At the root r player A chooses p1, while at p2
she chooses each of t3 and p3 with probability 1/2. Player B chooses each of t2 and p2 with
probability 1/2. The valuations that make this strategy proﬁle a SVE are as follows. The
valuation of each of the moves ti is the appropriate payoﬀ at this node. For p3, vB(fp3g) = 2,
which is the expected payoﬀ of this move for B. To ﬁnd vA(Pass), we note that Z(Pass),
the set of terminal nodes reached from Pass is ft2;t3;p3g. The conditional probability of
these nodes are 1/2, 1/4 and 1/4 respectively. Thus vA(Pass) = 1
2 ¢ 3 + 1
4 ¢ 2 + 1
4 ¢ 0 = 2.







4.3 Other approaches to move bundling
We use Example 3 for comparison between valuation equilibria and some alternative ways of
bundling moves.
Imperfect Recall (Piccione-Rubinstein 1997): Suppose that player A does not recall whether
he is at node r or at node p2 with a common action space ftake;passg.4 The correspond-
ing equilibrium (multi-self approach) is that i) Player A mixes 1
4take + 3
4pass in his unique
memory set fr;p2g and ii) Player B passes at node p1. In this case, player A behaves in the
same way at his two nodes. The outcome is never t2. The other three outcomes t1, t3, p3 all
occur with positive probability.
Other similarity classes and Imperfect Recall: It is also instructive to analyze the same
game with the valuation equilibrium approach whenever player A uses two similarity classes,
Pass = fp1;p3g and Take = ft1;t3g, and player B treats his two moves t2 and p2 separately.
In this case, there are several SVE’s. For example, one SVE is that: Player A mixes 1
5t1+ 4
5p1
at node r and 1
2t3 + 1
2p3 at node t = 3; Player B Passes at node t = 2. The valuations that
support this equilibrium are vA(Take) = vA(Pass) = 1, and vB(ft2g) = vB(fp2g) = 2.
Thus, in this case, even though player A bundles fp1;p3g on the one hand and ft1;t3g on
the other, the situation is very diﬀerent from the one analyzed above in which player A does
not distinguish between nodes t = 1 and 3. Here, in contrast to imperfect recall, SVE does
not require that player A behaves similarly at r and p2. Moreover, with our deﬁnition of
consistency, the equilibrium arising with the imperfect recall approach is not an SVE with
our assumed similarity partitioning. It would be if the consistency criterion were deﬁned by
weighting ﬁnal payoﬀs according to the number of times the corresponding path intersects
4”take” corresponds to t1 and t3; ”pass” corresponds to p1 and p3.
11the similarity classes.5
Analogy-based Expectation (Jehiel 2001): Suppose that player B only has an expectation
about the average pass/take behavior of player A all over the game (i.e., player B bundles
player A’s two nodes r and p2 into a single analogy class, see Jehiel 2001). The only analogy-
based expectation equilibrium is such that: i) Player A passes at node r and takes at node
p2, ii) Player B passes at node p1 (with the belief that player A mixes 1
2take + 1
2pass at his
two nodes r and p2). In this case, the outcome is t3. The behavior of player A at nodes r
and p2 is not the same and there is no mixing.
5 Aspiration-based equilibria
We now investigate similarity relations on moves that are based on the performance of these
moves relative to the equilibrium payoﬀ. We refer to the idea of aspiration because the clas-
siﬁcation of a move in these similarity relations depends only on whether the move performs
better, worse or similarly to the benchmark equilibrium payoﬀ.
Formally, for a strategy proﬁle ¾ and a node n 2 N[Z, we denote by ui(n;¾) the expected
payoﬀ of player i in the subgame Gn with root n, with the strategy ¾n induced on Gn by ¾.






We denote the expected payoﬀ of player i in the game ui(r;¾) by ui(¾). This expected payoﬀ
will be interpreted as the aspiration level of player i induced by ¾.
Given a strategy proﬁle ¾, we deﬁne for each player i the aspiration-based similarity




4pass at his two nodes and player B were to pass at node p1 (as in the














Thus, vA(Pass) > vA(Take) and player A should Pass rather than mix at his two nodes. (Hence, player A’s
strategy is not a best-response to his valuations.)
By contrast, if the consistency criterion incorporates the number of times pathes intersect the similarity






and with this alternative deﬁnition, the (multi-self) imperfect recall equilibrium would be an SVE.





i (¾) = fm 2 Mi j ui(m;¾) > ui(¾)g
¸0
i(¾) = fm 2 Mi j ui(m;¾) = ui(¾)g
¸¡
i (¾) = fm 2 Mi j ui(m;¾) < ui(¾)g
Note that one or two of these three sets may be empty.
Deﬁnition 3 A strategy proﬁle ¾ in the game G is an aspiration-based sequential val-
uation equilibrium (ASVE) if ¾ is a sequential valuation equilibrium with respect to the
aspiration-based similarity partitions Λ(¾) = (Λi(¾))i2I induced by it.
It follows from Proposition 8 below that for each game G there exists an ASVE. To study
the properties of ASVE it is useful to note that sequential consistency with ¾ of a valuation
vi on Λi(¾) implies that vi reﬂects the objective diﬀerences of utility in the three elements of
the partition.
Lemma 1 Suppose that a valuation vi on the aspiration-based similarity partition Λi(¾) is
sequentially consistent with ¾. Then,
² if ¸+
i (¾) 6= ;, then vi(¸+
i (¾)) > ui(¾),
² if ¸0
i(¾) 6= ;, then vi(¸0
i(¾)) = ui(¾),
² if ¸¡
i (¾) 6= ;, then vi(¸¡
i (¾)) < ui(¾),.
Proof: To see the ﬁrst inequality, let M = fm1;:::;mkg be a maximal set of points in
¸+
i (¾), such that each point in M does not have a descendant in ¸+
i (¾). Then Z(¸+
i (¾)) =
[k
j=1Z(mj), and the latter set is a disjoint union. Choose " > 0 such that ui(mj;¾) > ui(¾)+"
for j = 1;:::k. For a strategy proﬁle º which is close enough to ¾, also ui(mj;º) > ui(º)+"
for j = 1;:::k. Let º be such a completely mixed strategy proﬁle and let v0
i be i’s valuation
for º. Note that for a descendant z of mj, Pºmj





















i (¾))) > ui(º) + "
13By the sequential consistency of vi with ¾ it follows that vi(¸+
i (¾)) ¸ ui(¾) + " > ui(¾).
The last inequality is similarly proved. To show the equality we choose a subset M of
¸0
i(¾) as above. For each mj, ui(mj;¾) = ui(¾). Let " > 0. Then for a strategy proﬁle
º which is close enough to ¾, jui(mj;º) ¡ ui(º)j < ". For a completely mixed º and its
corresponding valuation v0
i we conclude by the above equations that
jv0
i(¸0










Since this is true for any º close enough to ¾ it follows that jvi(¸0
i(¾))¡ui(¾)j · ", and since
this is true for any " it follows that vi(¸0
i(¾)) = ui(¾).









An ASVE is not necessarily an equilibrium, as demonstrated in the game in Figure 4.
Consider the strategy proﬁle ¾ where player A plays t1 and p1 with probability 1/2 each,
and player B plays t2 and p2 with probability 1/2 each. Obviously, ¾ is not an equilibrium.
However, player’s B expected payoﬀ is 5/4 and therefore ¸¡
2 (¾) = ft2;p2g. Thus, ¾2 is
optimal for v2. It is easy to see that the rest of the requirement for ASVE are satisﬁed for ¾.
Even though the above ASVE is not an equilibrium, in ASVE player B obtains no less
than her individually rational payoﬀ (which is 1). This is no coincidence.
Proposition 7 Suppose that G is a game without moves of nature. Let ½i be the individual
rational payoﬀ of player i in the game G. If ¾ is an ASVE, then for each i, i’s expected
payoﬀ in G under ¾, ui(¾) is at least ½i.
Proof: Assume to the contrary that ui(¾) < ½i. We show that for each n 2 N [ Z, if i’s
individual rational payoﬀ in the subgame Gn, ½i(Gn) is at least ½i, then ui(n;¾) > ui(¾). The
14proof is by induction on the depth of the subgame. This trivially holds for n 2 Z. Suppose
now that ½i(Gn) ¸ ½i and the claim holds for all the subgames of Gn. If n 2 Nj for j 6= i,
then it must be the case that for each m 2 Mj(n), ½i(Gm) ¸ ½i. Thus by the induction
hypothesis for all m 2 Mi(n), ui(m;¾) > ui(¾). Therefore also ui(n;¾) > ui(¾). Suppose
now that n 2 Ni. Then there exists at least one m 2 Mi(n) such that ½i(Gm) ¸ ½i. By the
induction hypothesis, ui(m;¾) > ui(¾). It follows that m 2 ¸+
i (¾). Since the latter set is not
empty, and ¾i is optimal for vi, it follows by Lemma 1 that ¾i selects at n, with probability
1, nodes in ¸+
i (¾). Hence, by the deﬁnition of this set, ui(n;¾) > ui(¾). In particular, since
½i(Gr) = ½i, we derive the contradiction ui(r;¾) > ui(¾).
In particular for two-person zero-sum game we conclude:
Corollary 1 If G is a two-person zero-sum game without moves of nature, and ¾ is an
ASVE, then players’ equilibrium payoﬀs correspond to the value of the game.
The case of a single decision maker also follows immediately from Proposition 7.
Corollary 2 If G is a decision problem without moves of nature, then an ASVE is an optimal
decision.







We have seen that an ASVE is not necessarily an equilibrium. Conversely, an equilibrium
of G is not necessarily an ASVE. To see this consider the game tree in Figure 5. The strategy
proﬁle ¾ = (t1;t2) is a (non-perfect) Nash equilibrium. But ¸¡
2 (¾) = ft1g and ¸+
2 (¾) = fp2g
and the consistent valuations of these classes must be 0 and 2 correspondingly. Since ¾2 is
not optimal for v2, it follows that ¾ is not an ASVE.
The situation is diﬀerent for Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria.
Proposition 8 A Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of G is an ASVE.
15Proof: Let ¾ be a subgame perfect equilibrium of G. Using completely mixed strategy
proﬁles that converge to ¾ we can deﬁne for each player i a valuation vi on Λi(¾) which is
sequentially consistent with ¾. At each node n 2 Ni, ¾i selects with probability 1 nodes
m 2 Mi which maximize ui(m;¾). By Lemma 1, ¾ selects with probability 1 nodes with the
highest valuation at n. Thus, ¾i is optimal for vi.
Remark: Observe that unlike Proposition 7 and Corollaries 1 and 2, Proposition 8 holds
also when there are moves of nature. This is because it relies only on Lemma 1, which holds
for such cases.
Finally, we consider the following behavioral assumption:
Behavioral Assumption (BA): Whenever two successors belong to the same similarity
class, they are chosen with equal probability (i.e. ¾i(n) assigns the same probability to m,
m0 in Mi(n) whenever ¸(m) = ¸(m0)).
Such a behavioral assumption may reﬂect the idea that if two successors belong to the
same similarity class nothing allows the player to distinguish their relative strength, thus
suggesting that the two moves should be chosen with equal probability.
We note that while a subgame perfect equilibrium is always an ASVE, it need not in
general satisfy this equal probability assumption with respect to the associated aspiration-
based partitioning.
The following example illustrates this claim in the strong sense that the outcome of the
unique subgame perfect equilibrium may not be supported as the outcome of an ASVE with
such a behavioral requirement.
Example 4. The game in Figure 6 diﬀers from that in Figure 3 only in the payoﬀs.







The subgame perfect equilibrium results in the outcome t2. The associated aspiration-
based similarity classes are: ¸¡
A = ft1g, ¸0
A = fp1g, ¸+
A = ft3;p3g and ¸¡
B = fp2g, ¸0
B = ft2g.
By our assumed behavioral requirement, player A should play t3 and p3 each with probability
16half at node p2. But, this in turn implies that vB(p2) = 5+0
2 = 2:5 > 2 = f2(t2). Hence, by
the optimality of player B’s strategy, player B should play p2 and not t2 at node p1. Hence,
the perfect equilibrium outcome cannot be supported as the outcome of an ASVE satisfying
(BA).
Remark: In zero-sum two player games without chance moves, an ASVE satisfying (BA)
exists, and it leads to the value of the game, as shown in Corollary 1.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper has introduced a new solution concept viewed as the limiting point of a learning
process in which players would only try to learn the average performance of playing over
bundles of moves. The underlying model (as outlined in subsection 2.4) belongs to the family
of reinforcement learning models such as the ones considered in AI in the tradition of Samuel
(1959) (see Sutton and Barto 1998 for a recent textbook on this literature). Note that in
contrast to how reinforcement learning is modeled in game theory (see Fudenberg and Levine
1998 for a textbook on this) our underlying reinforcement learning does not consider the
reinforcement of strategies (but rather the reinforcement of similarity classes). In Jehiel and
Samet (2000) we considered the case where moves rather than strategies are reinforced and we
showed the convergence to the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium in extensive form games
with complete information. In this paper, we went one step further by assuming that moves
are bundled together into similarity classes and that reinforcement bears on the similarity
classes rather than on the moves separately.
Clearly, it remains to analyze further how players bundle moves into similarity classes, but
the present paper should be suggestive enough that this line of thought leads to considerations
previously unexplored in game theory.
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